Chile at WSIS+20: High expectations, moderate results

At the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), which concluded last December, Chile played a significant role in the negotiation process. It is worth recalling that the Summit sought to review the agreements reached in 2015, which revolved around the governance of digital technologies, at that time centered on people and focused on sustainable development, the fight against inequality, and closing the digital divide, among other objectives.

The 20-year review of the first Summit concluded in 2025 with a resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly that, in short, barely maintained the minimal aspects of past agreements, instead of moving towards urgent commitments such as, for example, recognizing and strengthening the accountability of the private sector, introducing greater safeguards and guarantees in relation to the deployment and development of artificial intelligence and even considering moratoriums on problematic uses, among others.

Chile: expectations and results of the negotiation process

In that multilateral negotiation process, which was complex and full of tensions given the current geopolitical scenario, Chile participated through the G77 + China and on its own, mobilizing four priorities: preserving commitments on development, the renewal of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and the continuity of the multi-stakeholder model, preserving pre-existing agreements on human rights, and making explicit efforts focused on gender equality.

These priorities are shaped by the international agenda pursued by Chile in recent years. Since 2024, the country has led the development agenda as co-chair of SDG 4, focused on equity in education. At the regional level, it has been vocal in its support for strengthening the Global Gender Gap Initiative (GGI) and reinforcing the multi-stakeholder model to improve internet governance. And consistently, in the most recent review of the WSIS, which took place in 2015, it defended human rights agreements, especially with regard to freedom of expression and privacy. More recently, the country’s international relations have focused on advocating for gender equality in multilateral forums, which have resonated in forums such as the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) and the negotiations of the Digital Global Compact.

In terms of development

In the development negotiations, Chile, both independently and within the framework of the G77 + China, supported maintaining references to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Countries like the United States argued that these references, along with those concerning human rights, should be removed to ensure the brevity and conciseness of the final resolution. This connection is crucial because the Summit aims to implement the Agenda through the governance of digital technologies. Removing this reference would have undermined the Summit’s foundational principles.

The resolution did, in fact, maintain some references to the 2030 Agenda. For example, it noted that closing the digital divide should focus on achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (paragraph 25), that coherence in the implementation of the Summit’s outcomes with the SDGs must be ensured (paragraph 106), and that efforts should be made to closely align the implementation of the Action Lines (critical axes of the Summit) with the 2030 Agenda (paragraph 111). It also tasked the United Nations agencies responsible for operationalizing its implementation with the SDGs (paragraph 122), among other things.

The IGF and the multi-stakeholder model

Regarding the renewal of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), the G77 + China advocated for the continuation of its mandate. While it can be improved, it is a critical forum whose mandate, according to the G77 + China, should be strengthened through a better structure, funding for its operation, and above all, through broader participation from countries of the Global South.

Regarding the multi-stakeholder model, the G77 + China pursued the same direction, by integrating into the negotiation process references focused on structuring, making transparent and improving the participation of stakeholders, especially from developing countries.

The Summit’s final resolution made the IGF’s mandate permanent and framed its future operation within UN budgetary procedures, calling for guaranteed stable and sustainable funding (paragraphs 96-103). It also referenced other multi-stakeholder forums (such as the NETMundial+10 guidelines) as a useful and aspirational reference in realizing this model, which, according to the resolution, should remain central to internet governance (paragraphs 91-94).

That the final resolution of the Summit once again mentioned the centrality of the multistakeholder model in the governance of digital technologies is not insignificant. In this recent negotiation, there were states -such as China or Russia- that in fact pushed to give greater prominence to other governance models based on a more intensive role for multilateralism, which centers on states as the most important actors. That the importance of the multistakeholder model was preserved and affirmed is an achievement that should not be underestimated, even though its inclusion was made without acknowledging the limitations it faces in the context of the current geopolitical landscape, where state relations are under serious strain and where the participation of civil society in the international sphere faces significant threats and risks.

Human rights

From the very first Summit, the human rights agenda was integrated across the entire concept of internet governance. References to human rights, such as freedom of expression and privacy, are included in the Tunis Agenda and the Geneva Plan of Action. During the Summit negotiations, Chile independently focused its efforts on preserving the agreements already reached, which countries like the United States sought to undermine by arguing for a more concise final text.

In the end, explicit references were indeed made to human rights in the resolution adopted in December 2025 (paragraphs 8–78), but there were omissions that were conspicuous by their absence, such as the impact of platformization on the world of work and on workers’ rights, or the weakened tone given to the commitments and responsibilities of the private sector, which, through its technologies and business models, profoundly affects the exercise of rights.

Gender equality

Chile, acting in its own mobilized efforts for the express recognition of gender violence facilitated by digital technologies, specifically, its recognition in paragraph 11 of the future resolution.

The final resolution acknowledged in that paragraph the mainstreaming of the gender perspective, the gender digital divide, and recognized the phenomenon of sexual and gender violence, although its language focused exclusively on the protection of women and girls, excluding LGBTIQA+ groups from the text.

Chile’s shift to the far right: Will the Summit be relevant for the local agenda?

In December 2025, Chile elected its first far-right government since the return of democracy. Local analysts point out that the foreign policy of the elected government remains an enigma, as it was deliberately excluded from the central themes of the electoral campaign. To date, according to various experts, Chilean foreign policy has been marked by “historical trends” rather than by ideological interests that shift with each new government. In other words, it has been characterized by its continuity, respect for international law, and a “professional, sober, and predictable diplomacy” and it is expected that this will continue during the upcoming inauguration of the new president, José Antonio Kast.

From this perspective, one might expect Chile to maintain its support for the broad commitments agreed upon at the WSIS revision, which concluded in 2025. However, serious doubts are emerging regarding specific support for objectives such as those outlined in paragraph 11 of the final resolution, which focuses on gender issues, since the president-elect has stated on several occasions that gender ideology must be eradicated from policies protecting women. In the past, in fact, he opposed the Gender Identity Law and even promoted legal action against affirmative action policies on sexual and reproductive health.

For now, the impact of the WSIS objectives and goals on local policies focused on internet governance and other digital technologies is uncertain, especially regarding the goals aimed at eradicating technology-facilitated gender-based violence. There is also no clarity on how the participation of citizens and civil society interested in influencing these public policies will materialize in practice.

For now, and until the president-elect takes office in March 2026, we must carefully observe the profile and approaches of the people who would take charge of the Ministry of Equality, the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which are central to the articulation of international digital and economic policy, and local digital policy.